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Purpose: This research studies the UAV incidents in the vicinity of  worldwide airports in order
to  deliver  a  quantitative  and qualitative  analysis  of  this  phaenomenon,  to  analyse  the  risks
associated to this threat and propose mitigation measures that brings this risk to an ‘acceptable’
level.
Design/methodology: A  population  of  139  ‘serious  UAV  incidents  in  the  vicinity  of
worldwide airports’ has been constituted on the basis of  the FAA and NASA databases and
articles  published on the Web by online media.  This phaenomenon has then been analysed
quantitatively using descriptive statistics techniques and qualitatively by analysing in-depth some
representative incidents. A risk analysis has then been performed based on the FAA Safety Risk
Management 5-steps process to identify the hazards i.e. the root causes of  those UAV incidents,
determine  their  outcome  i.e.  negative  consequences  that  jeopardize  airports  objectives  and
assign them a severity level and likelihood i.e. frequency level. Analysed risks have then been
assessed based on FAA ARP Risk Matrix. Mitigation measures (prevention, deterrence, denial,
detection, neutralisation) have been identified following a ‘Defence-in-Depth’ approach.
Findings: The findings of  the study are that those UAV incidents are more numerous than
anticipated and happen higher and further from the airports than expected: they happen not
only in CTRs but also in TMAs. This has an impact on the mitigation measures that shall not
only be deployed at airports side but also be on-boarded in manned aircrafts.
Originality/value:  To our knowledge, no study has combined different sources to constitute
such a population focused on ‘serious’ UAVs incidents around airports worldwide, has applied
the official FAA Safety Risk Management process to assess this risk and followed a structured
‘Defence-in-Depth’ approach typically used in Cybersecurity to mitigate this risk.
Keywords:  airport  security  and safety,  Unmanned Aerial  Vehicles  (UAVs)  threat,  risk  analysis  and
mitigation, Counter-UAVs technologies.
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1. Introduction
Civil UAVs market is developing at an exponential growth with business applications mainly inthe film industry,
aerial photography, inspection of  technical infrastructure like wind farms, real estate, agriculture and private and
public security. 
Today those UAVs are used as RPAS: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems with their pilot controlling the flight at
all time generally in Visual Line Of  Sight (VLOS) but even in Beyond Line Of  Sight (BLOS).
The next step, in a close future, is to have the UAVs performing autonomous flights for applications like parcel
delivery,  emergency  equipment  delivery,  search  and  rescue  at  sea… Autonomous  UAV flights  poses  some
technical challenges like the capability to ‘detect-and-avoid’ manned aircraft and other UAVs and organisational
challenges  like  their  integration  in  controlled  airspace  in  the  scope  of  the  next  generation  of  Air  Traffic
Management systems envisaged by the NextGen (US) and SESAR (EU) undertakings.
Professionals,  who leverage this  new UAV technology for expanding their  business,  have generally  no prior
knowledge in aviation but are used to professional responsibility and liability and tend to follow the rules whose
infringements could jeopardize their whole enterprise.  Professionals  who use UAVs thus tend to follow the
required training and observe all the safety procedures when operating their UAV.
Besides the evolution of  UAV business market, a UAV hobbyist market has developed where consumers, also
without  any  prior  knowledge  of  aviation  but  without  professional  liabilities,  have  been  able  to  acquire  in
multimedia chains, without any formality and warnings, powerful UAVs that can flight at several thousand feet
heights. Millions of  such UAVs have been sold and are in hands of  people who are unaware of  the damages they
could cause to civil aviation.
The press has been reporting, for a couple of  years, serious incidents where UAVs have been involved in Mid Air
Collisions (MAC) with manned aircrafts, Near Mid Air Collisions (NMAC) and airport airspace closures.
This study has been initiated to acquire a better knowledge of  the ‘UAV incidents phaenomenon in the vicinity
of  airports’, a place of  high concentration of  aircrafts where the most critical phases of  the flight: Taking off
and landing take place. The study also analyses and assesses the risk and propose mitigation measures.
This study will be used as a basis and context for my own PhD covering the ‘certification (DO178C/DO278) of
intelligent algorithms embedded in UAVs and integrated in air traffic control ground systems’.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Safety and security risk management for airports
Neubauer,  Fleet  and  Ayres (2015)  have  produced  a  Guidebook  for  Safety  Risk  Management  for  Airports which
provides guidance to assist airports on conducting Safety Risk Assessments (SRA)for addressing their specific
risks  in  the  scope  of  the  Safety  Risk  Management  (SRM)  process.  The  5  steps  of  the  SRM process  are
formalized in the guide: Describe the system, identify hazards, analyse risks, assess risks, mitigate risks. The
guidebook also provides a set of  useful templates and information which can be exploited when performing a
SRA: checklists, risk matrixes, severity and probability tables, preliminary hazard lists, mitigation tables, sample
reports for small  and large  airports,  typical  accident  and incident  rates,  typical  Key Performance Indicators
(KPI), basic probability and statistics.
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (2016) has published the Securing Smart Airports
report  which provides  a  guide  aimed at  airport  decision  makers,  airport  information  security  professionals,
national authorities in charge of  cyber-security for airports and cyber-security industry representatives. Smart
airports are those implementing new smart components providing improved services and user experience to
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travellers. However, those new smart components increase the ‘attack surface’ of  airport assets to new attack
vectors and the new risks they introduce need to be identified, assessed and mitigated. The report highlights key
assets of  smart airports, analyses their vulnerabilities to attack scenarios, prescribes good practices and concludes
with 8 recommendations, including the prioritisation of  cyber-security to guarantee passengers and operators
staff  safety. Of  particular interest and relevance to our study is the attack scenario: ‘drone intercept as mobile vehicle
for jamming and spoofing aircraft-airport and traffic control-airline communications’.
2.2. UAVs opportunities and threats for airports
Price and Forrest (2016) examine, in the chapter 9 of  their book, potential security threats to General Aviation
(GA) airports and provide strategies to protect them. GA consists of  flight operation that is not commercial
service or military i.e. flight training, recreational flights, business flights, experimental aircrafts, this with various
types of  aircrafts: jets, gliders, helicopters…The authors mention it is more likely that UAVs will start coexisting
with  manned  aircraft  when  operating  out  from  GA  facilities,  used  as  droneports,  rather  than  from  busy
commercial service airports. They report that in 2013, FAA picked 6 GA airports to perform researches about
standards for UAVs categories, traffic control procedures and NextGen, sense and avoid technologies, airspace
integration, differing climates, airworthiness, reliable data links and failure mode testing. Relevant to our study is
the identification of  the security threats for airports originated from UAVs: surveillance conducted on airport by
a spy UAV, UAV purposely flown into a passenger aircraft, UAV weaponized with a gun and used to attack high-
value targets after bypassing airport security perimeter, UAV transformed in flying Improvised Explosive Device
(IED) and flown in airports high-value targets, UAV carrying chemical, biological or radiological elements and
dispensing the agent in the air over the airport. The authors mention that from an airport operator’s perspective,
the main deterrence against illegal use of  drones for criminal or terrorist operations is to monitor UAVs activities
on and around the airport.
ACI Europe (2018) identifies drone risks posed to airports and their outcome: safety risk to aviation linked to
growing amateur drones fleet, including near misses and collisions with passenger aircrafts; disruption of  air
transport due to prompt closure of  runways, such as Dubai airport’s hour-long closure in October 2016,implying
substantial  financial  cost  for  airports  and  airlines  and  impacting  passengers’  journey.  The  ACI  report  also
mentions  UAVs  opportunities  for  airports  which  could  bring  process  improvements  and  cost  efficiencies:
pavement surface condition,  ground lighting, runways and taxi  ways inspections;  obstacle surveys; areas and
perimeters  surveillance;  construction  work  surveys;  improved situational  awareness  during  emergencies;  3D
mapping; aircraft checks, calibration of  navigational equipment (e.g. ILS). Hosting drones could also bring new
business opportunities for airports. The report explains that the simplification and automation of  drones traffic
management through Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) will optimize the limited ground and air capacities.
The report  concludes  with the  necessity  to finalise  the  European safety  rulebook on drones;  the  need for
guidelines and benchmarking related to measures protecting airports from drones (i.e. technical systems to detect
and neutralise drones); the need for authorities, Air Traffic Control (ATC) and operators to collaborate towards
integration of  drones in airport environments; the need to ready the industry for future drones opportunities.
Gettinger and Michel (2015) deliver a report that represents the results of  a detailed analysis of  921 incidents
involving UAVs and manned aircraft in the U.S. National Airspace System from December 2013 to September
2015. 2 categories of  incidents have been considered: Sightings where a pilot or air traffic controller spotted a
drone not posing an immediate threat of  collision and Near Mid Air Collisions (NMAC) as defined by the U.S.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Based on researches from the Crashworthiness for Aerospace Structures
and Hybrids (CRASH) Lab at Virginia Tech, the authors also discuss about the effects that a collision between a
UAV and a manned aircraft could lead to and identify the ‘at risk’ systems: radome, front exterior of  cockpit,
wing and empennage leading edges, flaps, stabilizers and finally… The propulsion system. The Virginia Tech
team found that if  a 1 meter diameter UAV was ingested into a 3 meter diameter turbofan engine, this could
cause engine failure.
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2.3. Counter-UAVs technologies
Wallace (2015) reports the most notorious security incidents involving UAVs and states the problem faced by law
enforcement and security agencies to combat the UAV threats:  poor understanding of  the issue due to the
novelty of  UAVs and lack of  cohesive defense strategy. The study seeks to answer the 2 following research
questions:  How are UAVs used for illegal purposes or terrorism? and What are the current defense methods against UAV
threats?.  The study identifies and describes  following UAV threats:  nuisance  to the  general  public,  including
individual’s  privacy  violation,  property  trespassing  and  children  and  animals  upsetting;  aerial  surveillance,
including observation of  young children and aerial reconnaissance to collect ‘intelligence’ information about the
vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures, government sites, business and private citizens in order to prepare an
attack  against  those  ‘targets’;  airspace  interference,  including  near-misses  between  UAVs  and  airliners  and
interruption of  aerial emergency responses due to the presence of  UAVs in the disaster area; Kinetic/Kamikaze
threat materialized when UAVs accidently cause damages to people or properties, but could also be used ‘out-of-
the-box’ to purposely cause injuries and even fatalities due to their lethal potential; Payload threat/smuggling,
including transportation of  illegal contraband or cargo, bypassing security barriers and perimeters like the ones
protecting a prison or a border. Weaponized threat consists in the construction and modification of  UAVs to
carry and employ different types of  weapons, including non-lethal and lethal projectile weapons, Improvised
Explosive  Devices  (IEDs)  and  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  (WMD)  based  on  chemical,  biological  and
radiological substances;  Electronic threat,  consisting in using a UAV to perpetrate a cyber-attack.  The study
presents the UAVs defense concepts, relying upon a ‘defense-in-depth’ approach organised into 5 concentric
layers: prevention through actionable intelligence, including UAV components purchase monitoring; deterrence
relying  on  new  legislations  to  both  fund  agencies  to  acquire  UAVs  defense  measures  and  to  establish
civil/criminal penalties to deter  illegal  UAVs use;  denial through passive security measures that decrease the
effectiveness of  UAVs in conducting illegal activities or terrorism, including the selection of  a right location that
presents impediments to a UAV attack (e.g. indoor rather than outdoor venue) and ‘geofencing’ implemented by
UAV manufacturers that prevents a ‘out-of-the-box’ UAV approaching critical infrastructures, including airports,
based on its Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) position;  detection of  the UAVs, identification and
tracking to prepare their neutralisation, including active detection with radars adapted to detect UAVs which
present small  cross-sections and radar software that distinguish them from birds and passive detection with
visual, acoustic, thermal/infrared and RF communications monitoring systems, this latter allowing to detect the
communication between the UAV and the radio-control unit of  its pilot;  interruption/destruction, including
interception of  the  pilot,  jamming  UAV’s  control  and/or  GNSS signals  to  interrupt  them,  spoofing  which
consists  in  sending falsified GNSS navigation or control  data,  destruction with projectile  weapons,  directed
energy weapons,  guided munitions and interception with a Counter-UAVs UAV. ‘Destructive’ techniques are
effective but can cause ‘collateral damages’ due to falling projectiles and debris  of  the hostile UAV with its
dangerous payload.
Michel (2018) provides a comprehensive market study that identifies 235 Counter-UAV products, already on the
market or in active development, produced by 155 manufacturers in 33 countries. The Counter-UAV market has
grown exponentially those last years, proportionally to the rise of  concerns around the drones threat. The author
mentions the usage of  Counter-UAV systems: on the battlefield, they are deployed to protect military bases,
mobile ground units and convoys; In civilian environments, they are used primarily for airspace protection at
airports, securing large events, VIP protection and counter-smuggling operations at prisons. Future applications
are protection of  critical infrastructures (on top of  airports) and private property protection. The study describes
the main detection and tracking techniques implemented by those products: radars, radio-frequency scanners,
electro-optical cameras, infrared cameras, acoustic sensors. The study notes that those techniques are usually
combined to increase the effectiveness of  the UAV detection system. Interdiction techniques are also described:
radio-frequency jamming,  GNSS jamming,  control  data spoofing,  electromagnetic  pulse,  laser,  nets,  machine
guns,  water  projectors,  sacrificial  collision  drones  and  are  also  usually  combined.  Those  detection  and
interdiction techniques are used alone or combined in systems that can be ground-based, hand-held or UAV-
based i.e. carried by a Counter-UAVs UAV. RF and GNSS jamming is the most common interdiction technique.
Relevant  to our own study,  it  shall  be  noted that  only  one system combines  ground-based and UAV-based
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elements  and only  2 products  are  based on projectiles  designated specifically  for  Counter-UAV. The report
describes  the  challenges  of  Counter-UAV  systems:  detection  effectiveness:  UAVs  are  small,  low  altitude
aircrafts which are hard to detect and can be confused with birds; false negatives and false positives: finding
the right ‘sensitiveness’ setting is a real challenge;  Distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate drone use: as
legitimate UAVs use is becoming common in the civilian environments and on the battlefield, the Counter-UAV
system should not shoot down a legitimate, ‘allied’ UAV. Interdiction hazards: kinetic interdiction techniques
are risky due to the fall of  the UAV or its debris on the ground and non-kinetic techniques can interfere with
legitimate communications. Interdiction effectiveness: some large scale trials have demonstrated that UAVs are
very resilient against damage and that most of  current solutions need further improvements. The report also
mentions  the  effectiveness  limitations  of  non-kinetic  techniques:  RF  jamming  is  useless  if  the  UAV  is
programmed to operate autonomously such as GNSS jamming in the case the UAV can operate in GNSS denied
environments, spoofing is  very difficult to implement.  Legality of  interdiction:  interdiction techniques like
jamming and spoofing can be illegal.  Lack of  standards: There are no standards for the design and use of
Counter-UAV systems,  implying  significant  performance and reliability  variances.  The  report  also  raises  the
concern that hostile UAVs might form a swarm, which is still more challenging to fight. The report also covers
the approach of  a Dutch firm: use (living) bird of  preys to intercept rogue UAVs. Relevant to our study is the
position  of  the  FAA that  ‘advised  airports  against  the  use  of  jammers  since  they  can  interrupt  air  traffic
management operations’ and the electronic identification which allows to quickly spot the ‘good’ UAVs in the
perimeter.
Buric and De Cubber (2017) provide an inventory of  the threats represented by malicious UAVs: violation of
privacy;  intelligence;  weapons  and ammunition  transport;  terrorist  attacks  using  weapons,  bombs,  grenades,
radioactive materials; intentional or unintentional collide with other authorized aircraft vehicles; using drones as
projectiles (kamikaze drones); people injuring; propaganda; critical infrastructure properties and goods damage;
transport of  the illegal objects (smugglers); stopping or slowing commercial UAVs industry development. They
describe the exploited vulnerabilities: Low cost of  recreational and commercial UAVs; Weakness of  the export
control;  Gaps into existing  regulatory  framework:  for  both using  UAVs and Counter-UAV tools,  this  latter
including the right to destroy a hostile UAV, the right to jam its  radio-communication,  the right to hack its
computer program; Lack of  the effective Counter-UAV technology, including the lack of  common standards
which could guide potential developers of  such systems; Deployment challenges taking into account the variety
of  environments where malicious UAVs could be encountered and conditions of  use: day, night, meteorological
conditions; misunderstanding by the different decision levels of  the real threat dimension i.e. decisions related to
regulatory  countermeasures  are  taken  at  different  administrative  and  political  levels;  technological  rapidly
development  that  brings  new  features  to  UAVs  and  increase  their  resistance  against  countermeasures  e.g.
commercial UAVs flying without GNSS, artificial intelligence that allows them to operate in swarm collaborative
mode;  ISTAR  capabilities  for  commercial  and  recreational  UAVs  i.e.  Information,  Surveillance,  Target
Acquisition and Reconnaissance which used to be limited to military UAVs; Commercial and recreational UAVs
modified to get  military  features i.e.  as  the ones modified by  ISIS in  order  to increase their  lethality,  their
effectiveness and resistance to countermeasures; environments where malicious UAVs can be used i.e. in more
and more busy RF spectrum and ‘noisy’  backgrounds making them more and more difficult  to  detect  and
classify.  The  study  proposes  an  architecture  for  a  Counter-UAV  system  and  a  5  steps  ‘kill  chain’  model:
detection: with active radar; passive radar i.e. use ‘electro smog’ generated by GSM or WIFI as a source of
illumination; passive optics: video, thermal or infrared cameras; active optics i.e. LIDAR; acoustic sensors; RF
emissions scanner; B-field detection i.e. exploiting disturbance of  the magnetic field around a UAV and qualify
their performance; A 3 steps classification process to be implemented by a data fusion algorithm: determine if
detected object is a UAV; determine if  it represents a threat; assess the risk level based on target type, direction
of  arrival,  range, velocity,  estimated time of  arrival,  number of  hostile  UAVs, number of  sensors that have
confirmed  target,  altitude,  output  from  queried  UAV traffic  management  database,  size;  Tracking of  the
threatening  UAVs  on  a  Geographic  Information  System (GIS)  map  with  their  ID;  Neutralization whose
method(s) are chosen according to the environment and its effects on target hostile UAVs among: geofencing,
firearms, lasers,  missiles,  gun nets,  counter-UAV UAVS, birds, jamming,  high power electromagnetic  weapon
(electronic blast), hacking; Forensic whose goal is to establish the identity of  the UAV owner, the purpose the
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UAV was used for, the flight path and the home point. The report also presents the SafeShore project whose
objectives are to cover gaps in European coastal border surveillance and prevent cross-border crime such as
trafficking in human beings and smuggling of  drugs. It addresses the threats presented by small UAVs departing
from maritime platforms such as yachts, boats and human intruders on the sea shore which cannot be detected
by regular coastal radars. SafeShore innovative UAVs detection solution leverages a 3D LIDAR combined with
passive acoustic sensors, passive radio frequency detection and cameras. Another goal of  SafeShore is to perform
fusion  of  information  to  increase  the  ‘situational  awareness’  of  actors  in  charge  of  the  European  coastal
protection.  Of  interest to our study is the high-level requirements specification for a Counter-UAV system:
should cover all  steps of  the ‘kill  chain’ i.e.  detection,  classification, risk assessment, tracking, neutralisation,
forensic; Detection should combine all types of  state-of-the-art sensors; Neutralization should include alternative
solutions ‘engaged’ according to results of  data fusion and processing, risk assessment and validated by a human;
Information should be gathered and analysed in the forensic phase to develop future preventive and reactive
measures;  Standard  interfaces  should  be  used  to  insure  interconnection  with  Law  Enforcement  Agencies
command  and control  rooms.  It  shall  be  noted  that  first  SafeShore  trials  have  taken  place  during  second
fortnight  of  May 2018 on the Belgian coast  where  the  prototype developed by the project  team has been
benchmarked with ‘off-the-shelf ’ detection solutions already available on the market based on Doppler radar,
electro-optic camera, infrared camera and acoustic sensor. At the moment of  writing the present article, test
results are being processed and compiled. In this coastal environment, the challenges are the ‘noise’ generated by
the waves motion and the high number of  birds flying which have to be distinguished from small UAVs.
Gettinger and  Michel (2015) also presents solutions that might reduce of  prevent UAV incidents: geo-fencing
like the one installed in the DJI and 3DR UAVs which maintains an up-to-date list of  restricted airspaces; Sense-
and-avoid systems that allow a UAV to detect a potential collision with another aircraft and take evasive action;
UAV Traffic Management (UTM) systems based on cellular networks.
3. UAV Incidents at Civilian Airports
3.1. Methodology
The  goal  was  to  constitute  a  population  of  worldwide  UAV  incidents  to  be  in  a  position  to  perform  a
quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to draw the characteristics of  the ‘UAV incidents at civilian airports’
phaenomenon.
A Google search has been initiated with the search keys: ‘UAV incidents airports’, ‘drone incidents airports’,
‘UAV incidents aéroports’, ‘drone incidents aéroports’.
Wikipedia (2018) has been spotted in the first page of  the search result and the UAV incidents referred in the
categories ‘Alleged aircraft collisions’ and ‘Aircraft near-miss incidents’ have been further analysed. The incidents
having happened in the vicinity of  civilian airports have been selected. Additional UAV airport incidents returned
by the searches result, mostly reported by the online media, have also been studied.
Those selected UAV airport incidents have then been ‘formatted’ as per following criteria: 
• Date. 
• Airport. 
• Incident Type. 
• Source of  information. 
• Manned aircraft type involved. 
• Number of  UAVs involved. 
• Flight phase. 
• Altitude (feet).
• Distance between UAV and aircraft (feet). 
• Distance from airport (KMs). 
• Indicator if  UAV was captured. 
• Indicator if  UAV pilot was identified. 
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• Effects of  incidents.
N.B. There is little info about the UAVs type involved in those incidents.
This search also allowed to identify Dan Gettinger and Arthur H. Michel (2015) which leverages the FAA (2018)
and NASA (2018) UAV incidents databases. Those 2 databases have been exploited and Near Mid Air Collision
(NMAC) incidents have been selected in our population. It must be noted that we retained only the incidents
where the manned aircraft pilot(s) have explicitly declared a NMAC.
A population of  139 UAV incidents in the vicinity (i.e. <35 kilometers) of  worldwide civilian airports has been
constituted and can be found in the Annex I.
The observation period is from May 2014 till May 2018.
Following chart provides the distribution of  those 139 UAVs incidents over their sources:
Figure 1. UAV incidents distributed per reporting sources (NASA & FAA, 2018)
Following chart provides the distribution of  those 139 UAVs incidents over the years of  the observation period:
Figure 2. UAV incidents distributed per year (NASA & FAA, 2018)
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3.2. Quantitative analysis
The population of  ‘UAV incidents in the vicinity of  worldwide civilian airports’ constituted in the scope of  this
study (Annex I) has been exploited to perform a statistical quantitative analysis of  this phaenomenon and answer
to a set of  questions.
3.2.1. What type of  UAV incidents?
Following chart provides the distribution of  those 139 UAVs incidents over the types of  incidents:
Figure 3. UAV incidents distributed per incident types (NASA & FAA, 2018)
Following table provides a definition of  the UAV incident types:
Incident Type Definition
Near Mid Air 
Collision (NMAC)
FAA defines a Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC) as an incident associated with the operation of  an 
aircraft in which a possibility of  a collision occurs as a result of  proximity of  less than 500 feet to another 
aircraft, or a report is received from a pilot or flight crew member stating that a collision hazard existed 
between two or more aircraft.
Mid Air Collision 
(MAC)
SKYbrary (2018) defines a Mid Air Collision (MAC) as an accident where two aircrafts come into 
contact with each other while both are in flight.
Airspace Closure Airspace closure, for an airport, is a period of  time during which no aircraft is permitted to 
operate to and from that airport. 
Jetliner Sighting ‘Jetliner Sighting’, as per our definition, is the action of  taking pictures and/or videos of  an 
aircraft, typically a jetliner, during its landing or taking off  phase with the camera embedded
in a UAV. Those pictures and/or videos are later on posted on the social media.
Airport indoor 
Sighting
‘Airport indoor Sighting’, as per our definition, is the action of  taking pictures and/or 
videos with the camera embedded in a UAV flying inside an airport hall.
Table 1. UAV incidents type definition
3.2.2. Where did those UAV incidents occur and the most affected airports?
Following chart provides the distribution of  the 139 UAVs incidents over the countries where they took place:
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Figure 4. UAV incidents distributed per country (NASA & FAA, 2018)
Interpretation:  United States authorities i.e.  NASA and FAA maintain and publish UAV incidents databases,
which are the main sources of  our study, besides worldwide online media. This is thus normal that we have more
cases reported in the U.S. United Kingdom has encountered many UAV incidents reported by the online media.
The root cause of  this proportionally high level of  UAV incidents in U.K. is worth further investigating.
A  ‘hit  parade’  of  the  airports  with  the  biggest  UAV  incidents  frequency  has  been  established  from  our
population:
Airport Number of  UAV incidents
Heathrow International Airport (GB) 9
Gatwick International Airport (GB) 3
London Stansted International Airport (GB) 1
TOTAL LONDON AIRPORTS 13
JFK  New York International Airport (US) 2
La Guardia New York International Airport (US) 4
Liberty Newark International Airport (US) 2
TOTAL NEW-YORK AIRPORTS 8
Miami International Airport (US) Nombre 4
Logan Boston International Airport (US) 3
Los Angeles International Airport (US) 3
Dubai International Airport (AE) 3
Philadelphia International Airport (US) Nombre 3
Table 2. Airports with highest UAV incidents frequency
A ‘hit  parade’  of  the airports  which have been the most impacted,  in term of  flights delayed,  returned or
diverted and the associated economic losses, has also been established from our population. Those airports have
faced ‘Airspace closure’ incidents:
Airport Number of  airspace closures
Dubai International Airport (AE) 3
Gatwick International Airport (GB) 2
Sharjah International Airport (AE) 1
Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport (CN) 1
Chongqing International Airport (CN) 1
Auckland International Airport (NZ)) 1
Table 3. Airports the most impacted due to their airspace closure
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N.B. Liège has not been included in the table as it only ‘suffered’ from a partial closure of  its airspace, the
runway has not been affected.
3.2.3. What types of  manned aircraft involved in UAV incidents?
Following chart provides the distribution of  the 2 MAC, 124 NMAC and 2 jetliner sighting incidents over the
types of  involved manned aircrafts:
Figure 5. UAV incidents distributed over manned aircraft types (NASA & FAA, 2018)
Interpretation: All types of  aircraft are affected by the phaenomenon. 
3.2.4. How many UAVs involved in the incidents?
Following chart  provides  the distribution of  the  UAV incidents  over the  number of  UAVs involved in  the
incident:
Figure 6. UAV incidents distributed over number of  involved UAVs (NASA & FAA, 2018)
3.2.5. UAVs incidents at take-off  or landing phase?
Following chart provides the distribution of  the 2 MAC, 124 NMAC and 2 jetliner sighting incidents over the
incidents over the take-off  and landing phases:
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Figure 7. UAV incidents distributed over taking off/on phases (NASA & FAA, 2018)
Interpretation: The trajectory of  a landing plane is different from the one of  a taking off  plane. A taking off
plane reaches a higher height at a shorter distance from the runway. 
3.2.6. At what height UAVs incidents happen?
Following chart provides the distribution of  the UAV incidents over the height intervals at which they happened
(when height was known):
Figure 8. UAV incidents distributed over the height interval (NASA & FAA, 2018)
Following table provides some statistical indicators about the height of  UAV incidents in our population and
compare them with (Gettinger & Michel, 2015):
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Statistical Indicator Value for our
population
Value found in Bard
College study
Interpretation
Average 3075 Feet Not Available  
Average 
≤ 5 NMs (Bard)
≤ 8 KMs (our)
1832 Feet 1887 Feet Very close values in the 2 studies.
Average 
> 5 NMs (Bard)
> 8 KMs (our)
4704 Feet 5032 Feet Very close values in the 2 studies.
Mediane 2500 Feet Not Available  
Range - Minimum 200 Feet Not Available  
Range - Maximum 12500 Feet Not Available  
Standard deviation 2568 Feet Not Available  
% > 400 Ft (Bard)
% > 500 Ft (our) 91.3 % 90.2 %
Max height for UAVs:
in U.S: 400 Feet.
in Europe: [300 - 500] Feet.
Table 4. Statistical indicators for UAV incidents height
Important remark: It shall be noted that for some UAV incidents, the height was provided at Mean Sea Level
(MSL, in which case the value represents an altitude), and in some cases Above Ground Level (AGL). Ideally for
our study, all height values should have been expressed AGL. We have NOT made the correction taking into
account the elevation of  the airport. So for some cases, the value represented in term of  MSL is higher than the
equivalent AGL value and thus those incidents are presented ‘higher’ than they actually are.
3.2.7. At what distance was the UAV from the manned aircraft?
Following chart provides the distribution of  the UAV incidents over the intervals of  distance between the UAV
and the manned aircraft (when such distance was known):
Figure 9. UAV incidents distributed over the distance intervals (NASA & FAA, 2018)
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Following table provides some statistical indicators about the distance between the UAV and the manned aircraft
in our population and compare them with the ones found in the Bard college study (Gettinger & Michel, 2015):
Statistical Indicator Value for our
population
Value found in Bard
College study
Interpretation
Average 113 Feet 217 Feet Bard  study  population  differs  from
ours as they also included sightings and
incidents where pilots did not explicitly
declared  NMAC.  Thus  our  incidents
are more ‘serious’ and the UAVs tend
to be closer from manned aircrafts in
our population. 
Mediane 90 Feet 150 Feet
Range - Minimum 0 Feet Not Available Collision!
Range - Maximum 1000 Feet Not Available One NMAC declared by pilot althoughdistance > 500 feet
Standard deviation 137.5 Feet Not Available  
Table 5. Statistical indicators for distance between UAV and manned aircraft
3.2.8. At what distance was the UAV from the airport?
Following chart provides the distribution of  the UAV incidents over the intervals of  distance between the UAV
and the airport (when such distance was known):
Figure 10. UAV incidents distributed over the distance from airport (NASA & FAA, 2018)
Following table provides some statistical indicators about the distance between the UAV and the airport in our
population and compare them with the ones found in the Bard college study (Gettinger & Michel, 2015):
Statistical Indicator Value for our
population
Value found in Bard
College study
Interpretation
Average 9.47 KMs Not Available
 Mediane 8 KMs Not Available
Range - Minimum 0 KM Not Available Above the runway!
Range - Maximum 31,5KMs Not Available  
Standard deviation 7.23 KMs Not Available  
% < 5 NMs (Bard)
% < 10 KMs (our) 63.7 % 58.8 %
Min distance from airport:
in U.S: 5 NM (9.26 KMs).
in Europe: [3 - 10] KMs.
Table 6. Statistical indicators for distance between UAV and airport
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Following chart shows the relation between the ‘distance from airport’ (X-axis) and ‘height’ (Y-axis) variables for
our UAV incidents population (when such distances and heights were known):
Figure 11. Relation between airport distance and incident height (NASA & FAA, 2018)
Interpretation: Distance from airport and height are linked by an increasing function: height of  UAV incidents
tend to increase as distance from airport increase. This could be linked to the trajectory of  aircrafts around
airports: they flight lower when closer to airports.
3.2.9. Have manned aircraft pilot taken evasive action?
Following chart shows the proportion of  our UAV incidents where the manned aircraft pilot(s) have undertaken
an evasive manoeuvre to avoid a collision with the UAV:
Figure 12. Proportion of  UAV incidents with evasive action (NASA & FAA, 2018)
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Interpretation: In many cases, manned aircraft pilots report they had no time to take evasive action and only
providence has helped in avoiding the collision with the UAV.
3.2.10. Have rogue pilot and/or UAV been captured?
Following chart  shows the proportion of  our UAV incidents where the rogue UAV pilot  or  UAV has been
captured:
Figure 13. Proportion of  UAV incidents with UAV captured (NASA & FAA, 2018)
Interpretation:  In 137 cases out  of  139,  neither the  pilot  nor the  UAV could be identified by  the  forensic
investigation that has been systematically launched after the incident. It shall be noted that for the 2 incidents
where the pilot was intercepted, 1 incident happened inside the hall of  an airport and for the other, a ‘jetliner
sighting’, the pilot could be identified because he posted the video on a social media and he could be tracked
back by IT forensic means. So, there is a total impunity for those who infringe UAV legislations worldwide
as authorities are helpless in identifying the outlaw UAV pilots and UAV!!!
3.3. Qualitative Analysis
3.3.1. Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC)
Some NMACs extracted from the FAA database (2018) and NASA database (2018):
PRELIM INFO FROM FAA OPS:  BALTIMORE, MD/UAS INCIDENT/1143E/BWI TRACON ADVISED
THAT A320,  REPORTED A NMAC WITH A UAS DESCRIBED AS ORANGE AND RED WITH 4
ROTORS AND 2 1/2 FEET IN DIAMETER AT SAME ALTITUDE WHILE WESTBOUND AT 800 FEET
2  E  BWI.  UAS  MISSED  WINDSCREEN  BY  20  FEET  LATERAL  SEPN.  ANNE  ARUNDEL  PD
NOTIFIED AT. OFFICERS SENT TO LOCATION OF UAS SIGHTING WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
UAS MOR Alert for BWI
Hazardous and/or Unauthorized UAS Activity
Date/Time: May 24, 2016 - 1537Z
A/C: A320
SUMMARY: PILOT NOTIFIED ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY POLICE, ROC, NCRCC, PCT.
PRELIM INFO FROM FAA OPS:  MIAMI,  FL/UAS INCIDENT/1623E/MIAMI  TRACON ADVISED
B767, BARCELONA, SPAIN-MIA, INBOUND FOR RUNWAY 12 REPORTED A NMAC WITH BLACK
AND ORANGE QUADCOPTER UAS, 4 FEET IN DIAMETER, AT 1,700 FEET 5 NW MIAMI. UAS WAS
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100  FEET  OFF  RIGHT  WING.  NO  EVASIVE  ACTION  TAKEN.  MIAMI  DADE  COUNTY  PD
AVIATION UNIT NOTIFIED. 
UAS MOR Alert for MIA
Type: Hazardous and/or Unauthorized UAS Activity
Date/Time: Sep 26, 2016 - 2023Z
A/C: (H/B763)
Summary:  WHILE ON ILS  APP FOR RWY 12  AT MIA,  ACFT REPORTED A UAS NEAR ILS  FIX
VEPCO (5NM NW OF MIA) AT 1,700FT.  PILOT ADVISED TO CALL FACILITY TO PROVIDE MORE
INFORMATION.   PILOT  SPOKE  TO  TRACON  FLM  AND  STATED  HE  SAW  A  BLACK  AND
ORANGE  OBJECT  WITH  4  PROPS  PASS  100FT  OF  HIS  RIGHT  WING.   THE  OBJECT  WAS  A
HAZARD  TO  HIS  AIRCRAFT  AND  CONSIDERED  THIS  A  NMAC.   PILOT  DID  NOT  TAKE
EVASSIVE ACTION, ALSO STATED THAT PASSENGERS DID SEE AN OBJECT OUT THE RIGHT
SIDE WINDOWS. DEN, ROC, MDPD NOTIFIED.   
PRELIM  INFO  FROM  FAA  OPS:  NEW  YORK,  NY/UAS  INCIDENT/1508E/LAGUARDIA  ATCT
ADVISED SOUTHWEST DAL -  LGA,  REPORTED A TEAL COLORED UAS 1,000  FEET BELOW
AIRCRAFT WHILE SOUTHWEST BOUND AT 3,000 FEET ON 6 MILE FINAL FOR RUNWAY 22.  NO
EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN.  NYPD AVIATION UNIT NOTIFIED.
CLOSE--OUT INFO FROM FAA OPS: NEW YORK, NY/UAS INCIDENT/1740E/LAGUARDIA ATCT
ADVISED SOUTHWEST DAL -  LGA,  PIC  REPORTED A NMAC  AND TCAS  RA WITH A TEAL
COLORED UAS. UAS WAS 1,000 FEET BELOW AIRCRAFT WHILE SOUTHWEST BOUND AT 3,000
FEET ON 6 MILE FINAL FOR RUNWAY 22.  NYPD AVIATION UNIT NOTIFIED.    
MOR Alert for LGA
Hazardous and/or Unauthorized UAS Activity
Date/Time: May 10, 2016 - 0ESAZ
A/C: (B737)
Summary: ACFT B737 REPORTED DRONE 6 NE OF LGA AT 2000 AS THEY WERE TURNING FINAL
FOR RY22.  DRONE WAS TEAL COLOR.
While on short final for runway 31L at 1500 feet, a drone/UAV was headed straight for our aircraft at a bearing
of  135 at a high rate of  closure and barely missed us. My first officer was the first to spot what he first thought
was a collection [of] balloons emerging from the runway 31L center line. As the object got closer we saw that the
object was some sort of  diamond-shaped drone with a single pusher prop behind it. The drone passed less than
50 feet directly over the nose of  our aircraft where we got a good look at it. We reported the encounter to
Tower. They tried, but could [not] successfully track the vehicle on radar.   This drone incident was a great
concern to me compared to the other encounters reported by aircraft this year for a variety of  reasons. First, was
the deliberate nature of  the drone's operator in heading right for our aircraft down the center line of  a major US
airport runway in a difficult political climate. Next, was the type of  drone used. This drone was not your typical
four-rotor  toy  as  in  previous  encounters.  The  four  to  five  foot  fixed-wing,  diamond-shape,  stealthy
police/military style fuselage, with short, blended, delta wings and down sloping winglets, had a belly mounted
camera globe. This was closely related to an upgraded 'Killer Bee (or Bat)' drone I once spotted during my time
as an aviator in the military. Finally, I was concerned that ATC had no ability to track this larger UAV and find
those responsible.   We need more visual binocular scanning from tower, rather than relying on Airport Radar
which doesn't seem to pick up drones of  the size and type I encountered. [Authorities] recommended to me that
a pilot should hit the ident button on the transponder when you see a drone coming in close proximity to your
aircraft.  He said it helps ATC better pinpoint the location of  these small vehicles (NASA - JFK Nov 2015
incident).
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While flying the FYTTE4 RNAV STAR to ORD, we were on downwind leg for Rwy 27R, level at 4000 MSL and
between the VULCN and HIMGO waypoints. I and the First Officer (FO) visually acquired a mostly stationary
airborne object ahead of  the aircraft and to the right side of  our flight path. We quickly closed with the object
and then the object passed off  the right side of  the aircraft at very close range. Although I had initially identified
the object as looking like some drifting party-type balloons, as we passed the object the FO stated 'I think it's a
drone'. While I never got a good enough look to be certain that the object was a small unmanned device, the FO
was in a much better position to visually track the object so I trust his judgment on the matter. In addition, I
noted that the object seemed to be very nearly motionless, which would be unusual for balloons, which are
generally ascending at low altitudes such as this one. After passing the object, the FO reported the presence of  a
possible drone just south of  our course at present position. The entire event happened so quickly that as the
Flying Pilot I didn't take any evasive action, since it appeared that we would miss the object narrowly off  our
right-hand side.  The cause of  the event would appear to be someone's  reckless decision to intentionally  or
mistakenly operate a small unmanned device in close proximity to air traffic executing arrival procedures to
ORD. Education of  small UAV operators is paramount to ensure that folks know that a small unmanned device
can pose a significant safety hazard for even such a significantly larger aircraft such as a jet airliner. In addition,
I'm certain that the technology exists to detect even small unmanned devices and alert the pilots of  larger aircraft
to their presence. That technology would be hugely helpful in preventing drone strikes and near misses (NASA -
Chicago Oct 2017 Incident).
3.3.2. Mid Air Collision (MAC)
Aviation Safety Network Database (2018) reports, as Case 201160, a Mid Air Collision between a UAV and a
Boeing 737-887 that took place on 11th November 2017. The jetliner was on approach to Buenos Aires Jorge
Newbery airport when it hit the UAV at about 1 kilometre from the runway. The aircraft could land safely and
suffered minor damage to the  left  hand fuselage  below the  left  hand flight  deck  window.  The aircraft  was
grounded for inspection. 
Infobae online journal has published a picture of  the damages:
Figure 14. Minor damage on Boeing 737-887 (Aviation Safety Network Database 2018)
The New York Times (2017) reports that a UAV crashed into a passenger aircraft, a Beech King Air A100 (multi-
propellers airliner), at his landing at Jean Lesage International Airport in Quebec city. The incident took place in
September 2017. The drone was flying at 1500 feet, five times as high of  what is permitted in Canada, and came
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from the left as the plane approached the runway. This was the first occurrence of  a collision between a UAV
and a commercial aircraft in Canada. The aircraft landed safely and suffered from minor damages: scratches on
the wing. The UAV could not be located neither his pilot identified.
Remark: numerous UK online media reported a collision between a UAV and a British Airways Airbus A320
jetliner during its approach to Heathrow London airport in April  2016. The forensic investigation found no
evidence of  a UAV collision and mentioned that the suspect object could have been a plastic bag.
3.3.3. Airspace closure
NATS2 (2017) provides a very interesting video about the 2nd July 2017 Gatwick UAV incident. 
It shows howthe spotting of  a UAV flying on the approach path to Gatwick airport evolves over the following
hours and impacts on air traffic: 
• Airport authorities decide to suspend arrivals and direct aircrafts to Timba and Willo hold zones. 
• Once the 2 hold zones have been filled up, arriving aircrafts were diverted to other airports due to fuel considerations and a
contingency hold was activated. 
• Then after checking the drone had disappeared, the runway was reopened for arrivals… 
• And shortly after, the drone was spotted again and arrivals were suspended again. 
• More aircrafts were diverted to other airports while the Solent ‘en-route’  hold was activated to retain traffic at higher
altitudes to spare fuel. 
• Runway was re-opened after further inspection verified that the drone had definitively gone away. 
• Disruptions it caused on the air traffic lasted till end of  the day, with returning aircrafts delayed at departure airports.
Figure 15. Air traffic Perturbation due to UAV at Gatwick (NATS2, 2017)
3.3.4. Airport indoor sighting
South China Morning Post3 (2017) reports a man has been arrested after flying a UAV in the restricted departure
area at the Honk Kong International Airport. 
He flew the UAV inside the hall of  the airport and took pictures while awaiting a flight to Tokyo. Hethen posted
the pictures on social media, which triggered a forensic investigation by the airport police who identified him.
He was intercepted by the police at the Honk Kong International Airport when he returned from Tokyo. The
UAV was found in his bag. He violated the Airport Authority Bylaw on flight safety and carries a maximum
penalty of  six months in jail and a 50 000 HK$ fine.
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3.3.5. Jetliner sighting
‘Jetliner sighting’ is a dangerous new trend. 
YouTube (2018) shows a frightening video of  a jetliner landing at the McCarran International Airport, taken by
an anonymous UAV pilot and published on the social media:
Figure 16. UAV picture of  Jetliner landing at McCarran Airport (YouTube, 2018)
South China Morning Post2 (2017) reports that a man has been held by Police after flying a UAV close to
landing aircraft to film it with the on-board camera. The UAV pilot has been identified by a reporter at the
Beijing Youth Daily who contacted the instant messaging number left on the video posted on a social media.
Figure 17. UAV picture of  landing Jetliner (South China Morning Post2, 2017)
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4. Risk Analysis and Mitigation
4.1. Methodology
We have followed the Safety Risk Management (SRM) 5-Steps process described in Neubauer et al. (2015).   
4.2. Describe the system
We have followed the 5M Model to describe the system.
4.2.1. Mission
In the scope of  our study, we will consider that the missions of  a civilian airport i.e. its objectives are:
1. To insure the safety of  passengers, personnel of  companies hosted at the airport including airlines and
own personnel within the physical perimeter of  the airport.
2. To protect assets of  passengers, of  companies hosted at airport including aircrafts and own assets within
the physical perimeter of  the airport.
3. To insure the safety of  passengers and crew on-board aircrafts  during their  taking-off  and landing
phases at the airport, within the airspace under its control i.e. equivalent of  Terminal Radar Approach
CONtrol (TRACON) in U.S. which usually handles traffic in a 30 to 50 Nautical Miles (56 to 93 KMs)
range from the airport.
4. To protect aircrafts assets during their taking-off  and landing phases at the airport within the airspace
under its control.
5. To maximize  the  passengers’  user  experience inside  the  perimeter  of  the airport  and on-board the
aircrafts taking off  and landing at the airport.
6. To minimize nuisances to its neighbourhood. 
7. To maximize the financial returns for its shareholders.
4.2.2. Man
In the scope of  our study, we will consider that the men… and women are:
1. The pilots of  the aircrafts taking off  and landing at the airport.
2. The air traffic controllers controlling the airspace under the responsibility of  the airport.
3. The personnel in charge of  the safety and security within the physical perimeter of  the airport.
4.2.3. Machine
In the scope of  our study, we will consider that the machines are:
1. The aircrafts taking off  and landing at the airport and stationary at the airport.
2. Equipment to insure the operation of  the airport, fixed (control tower) or mobile (gas truck).
4.2.4. Management 
In the scope of  our study, we will consider that the management is:
1. Coordination of  the physical security and safety at the airport.
2. Coordination of  the Air Traffic Control at the airport.
3. Coordination of  the actions in the cockpit of  aircrafts taking off  and landing at the airport.
4. Communication between airport Air Traffic Control and pilots during the taking off  and landing at the
airport.
4.2.5. Media (environment) 
In the scope of  our study, we will consider that the media is:
1. Weather and night conditions: fog, strong wind, rain, high and low temperatures, snow, ice…
2. Geo-political climate: terrorist attack threat, political tensions between states, tensions between religious
communities…
3. UAV market growth and UAV and Counter-UAV technologies evolution.
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4.3. Identify hazards, analyse and assess the risks
4.3.1. Identify hazards
Kenneth Neubauer et al.  (2015) defines a  hazard as  acondition that is a precondition to an accident or
incident.
First  column of  Table  VIIIidentifies  hazards  as  the  precondition  to  the  UAV incidents  in  our  population
(APPENDIX A).
4.3.2. Analyse the risks
The risk analysis consists in anticipating the potential outcomes from the identified hazards: Third column of
Table VIII and assign them a severity: Fourth column of  Table VIII and a likelihood: Fifth column of  Table
VIII.
In reference to K. Neubauer et al.  (2015), definition of  severity levels havebeen originated from FAA ARP
5200.11. and definition of  likelihood have been originated from FAA ARP internal order 5200.11. 
It  shall  be  noted that  in  our  study,  the probability  is  assessed for  one single  airport  and not  for  the
community of  all the airports in the world!
4.3.3. Assess the risks
Risk has been assessed based on FAA ARP Risk Matrix (Order 5200.11 change 2) found in K. Neubauer et al.
(2015):
Table 7. FAA ARP Risk Matrix
4.3.4. Assess the risks
Following table formalizes the outcome of  the hazards identification, risk analysis and risk assessment steps:
Hazard UAV Incident Outcome Severity 
Level
Likelihood Level
A UAV pilot wants to 
capture photos/videos 




-Discomfort of  little risk to 
passengers, as passengers see 
UAV.
-Minimal risk on operation of  
aircraft, as pilot(s) are distracted 
by UAV.
Minimal (5) Remote (1 x in 1 year)
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Hazard UAV Incident Outcome Severity 
Level
Likelihood Level
A UAV pilot wants to 
capture photos/videos 
of  landing/taking off  
aircrafts.
A UAV pilot flies too 
high in the vicinity of  
the airport (>[300 - 500]
Feet) and/or too close 
of  the runway ( < [3 - 
10] KMs) without 
authorizations from 
ATC.
UAV NMAC -Discomfort of  little risk to 
passengers, as passengers see 
UAV.
-Minimal risk on operation of  
aircraft, as pilot(s) are distracted 
by UAV.
Minimal (5) Remote (1 x in 1 year)
-Evasive action from aircraft 
pilot(s) to keep separation with 
UAV.
-Physical distress on passenger 
due to abrupt evasive 
manoeuvre.
Major (3) Remote (1 x in 1 year)
UAV MAC -Minimal damage to aircraft. Minor (4) Extremely Remote              
(1 x in 10 year)
-Major damage to aircraft 
and/or minor injury to 
passengers. 
Major (3) Extremely Remote              
(1 x in 10 year)
-Severe damage to aircraft 
and/or serious injury to 
passengers. 
Hazardous (2) Extremely improbable (1 x 
in 100 years)
-Complete loss of  aircraft 
and/or fatalities in passengers. 




-Flights diverted, delayed, 
cancelled and/or returned.
-Passengers stranded at airport 
or diverted to alternative 
airports.
-Economic losses for airport 
and airlines.
Hazardous (2) Extremely Remote (1 x in 
10 year)
A UAV pilot wants to 
capture photos/videos 





-Discomfort of  little risk to 
passengers
Minimal (5) Remote (1 x in 1 year)
-Minor injury to passengers Minor (4) Extremely Remote(1 x in 
10 year)
Table 8. Hazards as precondition to UAV incidents, risk analysis and assessment
4.4. Mitigate the risks
We have followed the ‘defense-in-depth’  approach described in Wallace (2015) to identify the measures that
mitigates the analysed risks and more specifically the extremely improbable but  catastrophic scenario where a
UAV pilot flies too high in the vicinity of  the airport and/or too close of  the runway without authorizations




Mitigation Measure Main Responsibility Effect of  Measure on Risk
Prevention Harmonized UAV legislations ruling 
the UAV flights in the vicinity of  
airports and UAV pilot training
Authorities -A legal framework is set to forbid 
dangerous UAV pilots actions and 
penalties are defined
Prevention Legislations are ‘evangelized’ through 
media campaign and UAV selling 
channels
Authorities -The legislation is known by the 
owners and pilots of  UAVs
Prevention UAV pilots are trained and know the 
rules to observe in the vicinity of  
airports
UAV Community -UAV pilots know the rules, 
procedures and restrictions to 
flight in the vicinity of  airpo
Deterrence Record identity of  UAV owner at 
purchase time
Authorities -UAV owners know that they can 
be tracked back from the serial 
number of  their UAV
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Defence in Depth
Layer (Wallace, 2015)
Mitigation Measure Main Responsibility Effect of  Measure on Risk
Deterrence Get the mean to enforce the legislation 
and identify the offenders (C.F. 
neutralisation)
Authorities -UAV owners and pilots know that 
they will be identified and 
prosecuted for their illegal flights 
in the vicinity of  airports
Denial Implement ‘flexible’ geo-fencing in 
UAVs so that the UAV will not enter 
the airport CTR without authorization 
UAV Community -UAV pilots are protected from 
accidental violations of  the CTR 
airspace, while having the 
possibility of  flying there if  
required (e.g. jetliner inspection 
with UAV)
N.B. this measure is applicable to 
off-the-shelf  UAVs but is harder to
apply to custom UAV 
Denial Implement UAV Traffic Management 
(UTM) systems allowing UAV pilots to 
prepare and record their flight plans. 
UAV are tracked by the UTM thanks to 
their emitted electronic ID. 
UAV Community -UAV pilots are protected from 
accidental violations of  the CTR 
airspace and other airspace (eg 
TMA) in the vicinity of  airports.
N.B. this measure is applicable to  
off-the-shelf  UAVs but is harder to
apply to custom UAV
Detection Implement Detect-and-avoid systems in
UAVs to avoid collision with other 
aircrafts (and UAVs…) – ACAS Xu
UAV Community - The UAV remains ‘well clear’ (> 
500 feet) from aircraft.
Detection Implement sense-and-avoid systems in 
aircrafts to avoid collision with UAVs – 
ACAS Xa for commercial aviation and 
ACAS Xp for general aviation.
Manned aviation
Community
-The aircraft remains ‘well clear’ (>
500 feet) from UAV.
Detection Implement radars and cameras at 
airport to detect UAVs in its CTR 
Manned aviation
Community
-Not authorized UAVs are detected
in the airport’s CTR which remains
a ‘sanctuary’ where aircrafts can 
land and take off  safely (as those 




Operate Counter-UAV helidrones that 
catches the illegal UAVs in the airports 
vicinity with a net. 
This helidrone will start as an RPAS 
before becoming autonomous when it 
will have learned from the expertise of  
its human pilots and from its missions.
Authorities -UAV legislation is enforced as 
illegal UAVs operating in the 
vicinity of  airports are captured 
and can be tracked back to their 
pilot/owner.
-Collateral damages are minimized 
(no projectiles, no 
spoofing/jamming signals 
emissions that could interfere with 
airports equipment)
Table 9. Mitigation measures addressing illegal UAV risks in the vicinity of  airports
5. Conclusions and Future Works
The effort to carry on this study has been larger than expected due to the bigger than expected number of
‘serious’ UAV incidents encountered at the vicinity of  worldwide airports.
This shows that this phaenomenon is worth being considered and addressed by the worldwide civil airport and
aviation authorities and associated risks should be mitigated.
We hope that the report will help them to better seize and understand the phaenomenon and initiate appropriate
actions at national and international levels.
Except  for  U.S.,  where  the  FAA and  NASA maintain  and  publish  UAV incidents  databases,  national  and
international civil  aviation organisations worldwide, like EASA, do not publish UAV incidents (do they even
maintain such databases?). Such UAV incidents database are very good sources for analysing such phaenomenon
and its evolution over the years. You cannot control what you can’t measure! 
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The  findings  of  the  study,  compared  to  what  was  anticipated  when  initiated,  is  that  those  UAV
incidents are more numerous and happen higher and further from the airports than expected: They
happen not only in CTRs but also in TMAs. This has of  course an impact on the mitigation measures:
they shall not only be deployed at airports side but also be on-boarded in manned aircrafts!
The study could not determine an important point: Who are those illegal UAV pilots and what are their
motivations? This because the illegal  UAVs cannot be intercepted so far and tracked back to their
pilot/owner.
Future works will be pursued:
• Risk analysis  and assessment of  UAV hazards that  have not yet  (fortunately!)  materialized:  terrorist
attack lead or facilitated with UAVs against  airports and stationary,  landing and taking-off  aircrafts,
cyber-attacks facilitated by UAVs as part of  ‘hybrid wars’ in highly instable geo-political contexts…
• Maintain  the  UAV incidents  database  and  expand  it  as  such  incidents  become published  by  more
national and international civil aviation authorities worldwide.
• Share the study with the national and international UAVs, airports and civil  aviation authorities and
communities to inform them and collect their feedback to make the study evolve.
• Share the study with the Counter-UAV industry so that they can develop products and services that
address this risk appropriately, effectively and efficiently and that respond to worldwide airport and civil
aviation authorities needs and requirements.
• Leverage the study in the scope of  own PhD whose subject is the certification (DO178C/DO278) of
‘intelligent’ algorithms embedded in UAVs and integrated in air traffic control ground systems. Those
algorithms are aimed to be implemented in the detection and neutralisation systems mentioned in the
present article:
◦ Detect-and-avoid systems embedded in UAVs to avoid collision with manned aircrafts and other
UAVs.
◦ Detect-and-avoid systems embedded in aircrafts to avoid collision with UAVs.
◦ Detection systems deployed at airports to detect UAVs in their CTR.
◦ Autonomous Counter-UAV helidrones that can intercept illegal UAVs and catch them with a net.
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